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THE EXERCISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
BY COMMON CARRIERS
Notwithstanding the provisions of the federal constitution
that "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States" (Art. I, Sec. I), that "the
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America" (Art. II, Sec. i) and "the judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish" (Art. III, Sec. i), at the present through
certain legislation and by virtue of judicial decisions these powers
are in part at least exercised by agencies other than those pro-
vided for in the constitution. Common carriers subject to the
act to regulate commerce, as amended, have committed to them
the making, altering and repealing of laws (rules of action), the
enforcing of those laws and initially deciding as to the reasonable-
ness of rates and charges and the interpretation and construction
of the laws promulgated by them,-duties imposed by the consti-
tution on the congress, the president and the federal judiciary.
That an appeal from the carriers lies with respect to the rates
and charges, rules and regulations, to determine whether they are
in harmony with the mandates of congress does not change the
fact stated.
There can be little doubt at this late day of what is confided
to the three grand divisions of the federal government, nor of
the limits of the powers conferred. The duty of the legislature
is to make, alter and repeal laws; of 'the executive to execute
and enforce those laws; of the judiciary to interpret the laws,
and as well determine controversies; or, to put it as did Chief
Justice Marshall in Wyman v. Southard, io Wheat. I, 46: "The
difference between the departments undoubtedly is, that the
legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary con-
strues the law."
Not all common carriers are to-day endowed with, nor can all
exercise, the legislative, executive and judicial powers. It is
only those subject to the act to regulate commerce, as amended.
These include. "any corporation or any person or persons engaged
in the transportation of oil or other commodity, except water
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and except natural or artificial gas, by means of pipe lines, or
partly by pipe lines and partly by railroad, or partly by pipe
lines and partly by water, .... .telegraph, telephone, and
cable companies (whether wire or wireless) engaged in send-
ing messages from one state, territory, or district of the United
States, to any other state, territory, or district of the United
States, or to any foreign country . . . . and common carrier
or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers and
property wholly by railroad (or partly by railroad and partly by
water) when both are used under a common control, manage-
ment, or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment
from one state or territory of the United States or the District
of Columbia, to any other state or territory of the United
States or the District of Columbia, or from one place in a terri-
tory to another place in the same territory, or from any place
in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from
one place in the United States through a foreign country to any
other place in the United States."'-
The term "common carrier" includes express and sleeping
car companies, and the term "railroad" includes "bridges and
ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and
also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad,
whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or
lease, and shall also include all switches, spurs, tracks, and
terminal facilities of every kind used or necessary in the trans-
portation of the persons or property designaied herein, and also
all freight depots, yards, and grounds used or necessary in the
transportation and delivery of said property."
2
Without considering what carriers are and what carriers are
not subject to the act to regulate commerce, as amended,
2 and
what is or is not within the statutory definitions as above given,
suffice it now to say that those subject to the act and within the
definitions probably exceed 8,ooo in number.
The manner in which these carriers exercise legislative func-
tions is through their tariffs, schedules of rates and charges,
and classifications. These documents are the result of the work
'Sec. i, Act to Regulate Commerce, approved February 4, 1887, as
amended.
'Sec. i, Act to Regulate Commerce, as amended.
"Those interested may consult U. S. v. Louisiana & Pacific Ry. Co.,
234 U. S. I; U. S. v. Butler Co. Ry., 234 U. S. 29.
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of individual carriers (other carriers concurring) and of com-
mittees and associations, of carriers; relatively there are less
of the latter than of the former, but the latter are more compre-
hensive. The committees or associations are composed of
representatives of carriers from the freight or passenger depart-
ments as the duties of the committee or association may require.
The work of the committees or associations includes classifica-
tion of freight, rates, demurrage, etc., one committee confining
its work to one subject. The modus operandi in committee or
association is a proposal by one or more representatives of a
change in an existing rating in a classification, or a change in
rate, or the initiation of a new classification or rate; similar
procedure is followed concerning rules and regulations. Recently
it has been the practice of classification committees to have a
docket of these proposals; through this medium public notice
is given of subjects to be considered and shippers upon request
are permitted to present to meetings their views respecting the
proposed changes. In rate committees no such opportunity is
afforded. What these various committees and associations
determine become part of the tariffs or schedules of rates filed
and published in pursuance of law.
These several committees and associations have "jurisdiction"
over particular matters such as classification, rates, etc., over
definite territory.
Whatever provision is in a tariff or schedule of rates it must
as long as it is in force and effect be strictly observed and fol-
lowed.5 In no case or under no circumstances can any provision
be deviated from, unless one subject himself to the penalty pro-
vided. Those provisions become and are the law in the particular
matter. The Elkins Law (Act February 19, 1903, as amended
by Act June 29, 19o6), makes it a misdemeanor to wilfully fail
'The legality of these committees and associations under the Sherman
Anti-trust Act and similar acts is doubtful.
'In addition to the wording of the Elkins Law (Act February 19, 19o3,
as amended by Act June 29, i9o6) the Supreme Court has held that tariffs
when filed and published must be observed and not deviated from. In a
recent case, after citing a number of cases, the Supreme Court said: "We
regard these cases as settling the proposition that the shipper as well as the
carrier is bound to take notice of the filed tariff rates, and that so long as
they remain operative they are conclusive as to the rights of parties, in
the absence of facts or circumstances showing an attempt at rebating or
false billing." Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Robinson, 233 U. S.
173.
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to strictly observe filed and published tariffs until changed
according to law, the corporation being subject to a fine of from
$i,ooo to $2o,ooo, and the individual to fine and imprisonment.
Subject to the exercise of the extraordinary power of the
Commission to suspend the operation of a tariff or schedule of
rates and postpone the effective date, these documents and the
provisions thereof take effect on the date named therein, thirty
days after filing. The power of the Commission just referred to
was given it by the act of I9io; it now appears as a part of
section 15. The exercise of the power has not been frequent,
for in the five years since the enactment there have been less
than 700 cases. It may therefore be said that as a practical
matter all schedules and tariffs take effect as and when the
committees or associations of carriers choose.
Neither contracts made in good faith prior to tariff provisions
nor verbal agreements can change them.6 They are immutable,
unless and until through a proceeding before the Commission
it shall have determined that the rate or charge, or the rules
and regulations, are in contravention of the inhibitions of the act.
Such proceeding usually requires a year, during which the tariff
rates and charges, rules and regulations must be observed.
It is thus seen that common carriers subject to the act to
regulate commerce by and through their committees and asso-
ciations legislate in respect to interstate transportation, make
rules of conduct equal in force and effect to and as binding as
any statute which congress has ever enacted.
And it is the duty of these carriers to enforce and execute
these tariff provisions, these laws which they have made. They
are not at liberty to waive any provision, nor to promise any
service not provided for in the tariff.7 They must collect under-
charges, even to the extent of bringing suits for small amounts.'
SArmour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 56; Louisville & Nashville Ry.
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149; Kansas City Sou. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S.,
573; Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 513.
'Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. I55.
8 Conf. Rul. 314: "The law requires the carrier to collect and the party
legally responsible to pay the lawfully established rates without deviation
therefrom. It follows that it is the duty of carriers to exhaust their
legal remedies in order to collect undercharges from the party or parties
legally responsible therefor. It is not -for the Commission, however, to
determine it any case which party, consignor or consignee, is legally liable
for the undercharge, that being a question determinable only by a court
having jurisdiction and upon the facts of each case."
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Failure to compel obedience to tariff provisions subjects carriers
to punishment; the failure of the President to execute and
enforce faithfully the laws of the United States subjects him to
impeachment. Thus are the carriers called upon to exercise
executive powers.
Tariffs or schedules contain more than rates and charges;
they contain rules and regulations. With respect to rates and
charges, the carriers almost uniformly decide that they are just,
reasonable and non-discriminatory. It is a common saying that
no one can properly interpret and construe a tariff except the
man who wrote it and he is dead! While tariffs and schedules
should be unambiguous, plain and simple,9 yet many thousands
contain language of uncertain meaning. Who shall promptly
and properly perform the judicial task of interpretation and
construction? The shipper does not want a ruling next week; he
wants it at once. The carrier necessarily performs this service.
However captious, however unreasonable, however discriminatory
the interpretation it must stand until the matter has been passed
upon by the Commission. Rules and regulations may be inhar-
monious with the provisions of the statute; the power of the
Commission must be invoked; pendente lite the rule or regula-
tion prevails and must be obeyed whatever the inconvenience or
cost. The judicial power of the carriers has been invoked and
their decision is in force until they have been overruled, as it
were, by the Commission. Thus do carriers exercise the judicial
powers; and not infrequently, to their own profit, advantage
and benefit.
As the law is to-day, common carriers subject to the act to
regulate commerce legislate through their tariffs or schedules in
respect to rates and charges and rules and regulations for inter-
state transportation; the same agencies perform the executive
function of executing and enforcing those mandates which they
have promulgated; and the same public utilities perform for a
time at least with respect to their publications the judicial duties
of decision concerning rates and charges and interpretation and
A tariff should not be ambiguous and uncertain and place upon some
clerk the burden of construing it. Standard Oil Co. v. I. T. R. R., 23
I. C. C. 369. Also, Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. S. P. & S. Ry. Co., 2o
I. C. C. 546; Sweeney, Lynes & Co. v. N. Y. P. & N. Ry., 20 I. C. C. 6oo.
The duty rests on the carrier to clearly state its rates and charges in
its tariffs. Ford Co. v. I. C. Ry., '9 I. C. C. 5o7. There are numerous
cases to the same effect.
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construction of rules and regulations. The powers so exercised
result in part from the power of initiating rates which the
carriers have and from the statutory provisions requiring the
strict observance of the filed and published tariffs; and in part,
from the carriers arrogating to themselves the right to interpret
and construe that which they have enunciated. And, notwith-
standing the supposed rule that no one agency can exercise other
than the one power granted it, the common carriers subject to
the act to regulate commerce exercise all three of the powers
of the federal government.
JOHN B. DisH.
DENVER, CoLoRADo, November, 1915.
